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Tuition levels at Ontario universities have risen along with the value of merit-based entry 
scholarships provided by the nineteen institutions in this relatively closed system. We use data 
on entering students from 1994 through 2005 and find that merit awards have at most a small 
effect on a university’s share of academically strong registrants.  Such aid, however, is strongly 
associated with an increase in the ratio of students from low-income neighborhoods to students 
from high-income neighborhoods.  Finally, although more advantaged students are more likely to 
attend university, merit aid is not strongly skewed towards the more advantaged conditional upon 
registration. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990’s, more than a dozen states in the U.S. have established broad-
based merit aid programs that waive or greatly reduce tuition and fees at public colleges and 
universities in the home state.  The purposes of these scholarships have been to facilitate 
participation in post-secondary education and encourage high ability students to stay in state.  
Over the same period, a growing number of universities in Ontario made the unilateral (not 
provincially mandated) decision to institute programs of guaranteed merit scholarships for 
incoming, and in some cases, continuing students.  Virtually all Ontario universities are 
publicly funded and the system is quite self-contained. Ninety-five percent of university 
students from Ontario are enrolled at Ontario universities and 95% of Canadian students (and 
90% of all students) enrolled at Ontario universities are from Ontario (Statistics Canada 2008).  
The main purpose of the scholarships in Ontario is neither to promote post-secondary 
educational participation nor to keep high ability students in the province but rather to attract 
academically strong students to the individual institution.  Throughout 1994-2005, which is the 
period covered in this paper, Ontario had 19 such institutions. In 1994 only two of these 
universities had guaranteed entry scholarships for students with a high school grade point 
average (GPA) of 80 or more and another eight universities had guaranteed entry scholarships 
for students with a GPA of 90 or more.  By 2005, thirteen (sixteen) universities had guaranteed 
entry scholarships for students with a GPA of 80 (90) or more,  
The questions that we consider in this paper are related, but not identical to, the 
questions that have been addressed in the U.S. literature.  The first question we consider is 
whether or not these scholarships had an impact on the distribution of high performing Ontario   2
high school students across the 19 universities in this relatively closed system.  In other words, 
does merit aid attract a greater share of strong students to an institution?  The appeal of these 
scholarships may be different for students from different socioeconomic backgrounds.  Hence, 
we ask a second question.   Does the answer to the first question, the impact of these 
scholarships on the proportion of high performing students enrolled at a university, vary among 
students from low-income, middle-income and high-income neighbourhoods?    Students from 
different socioeconomic backgrounds may also vary in the ability to qualify for merit aid.  
Hence, we ask a third question.  Are the students from more privileged backgrounds 
disproportionately likely to benefit from this form of aid?  More specifically, how are the 
benefits of this merit aid distributed across students from low-income, middle-income and 
high-income neighbourhoods? 
The next section provides a review of the literature.  A description of the Ontario 
university system and our data are presented in Section 3.  Our regression results are presented 
and discussed in Section 4.  A summary and conclusion are in Section 5. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Three recent Canadian studies have examined the determinants of choices concerning 
university applications and enrolment though none of these considers merit-based aid.  Two of 
these studies used the university level data provided by the annual “universities” issue of 
Maclean’s magazine.  These rankings, which are similar to those provided by U.S. News for 
American colleges and universities are provided within three categories:  Medical/Doctoral, 
Comprehensive and Primarily Undergraduate.  Mueller and Rockerbie (2005) report that the   3
annual rankings in Maclean’s magazine have a significant impact on both total applications and 
high school grade averages among first year students at Ontario universities for the period 
1994 through 2000.   This effect was strongest for Medical/Doctoral universities and weakest 
for Primarily Undergraduate universities.  Kong and Veall (2005) use similar measures for all 
Canadian universities over the period 1991 through 2004.   They find that an increase in the 
Maclean’s ranking is associated only weakly with an increase in high school grade averages 
among entering students at Medical/Doctoral universities and is not associated with increased 
enrolments at any category of university. Drewes and Michael (2004) use individual 
application data from the Ontario Universities Application Centre (OUAC) for Ontario 
students applying for admission in the 2001-2002 academic year.  A low Maclean’s ranking 
reduces applications from academically stronger students to Primarily Undergraduate 
universities but not at other institutions.  They also report that applicants prefer universities that 
spend a larger proportion of their operating budget on scholarships and non-academic student 
services.  
A second strand of Canadian literature examines the relationship between family 
income and participation in postsecondary education (Bouchard and Zhao 2000, Christofides, 
Cirello and Hoy 2001, Corak, Lipps and Zhao 2003, Bowlby and McMullen 2002, Tomkowicz 
and Bushnik 2003, and Barr-Telford et al. 2003).  Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 
the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics and the General Social Survey have all indicated 
that rising levels of tuition and debt have not resulted in marked change in the differences in 
participation rates by level of family income over the past 10-15 years.     
  The earliest example of the “new merit aid” in the U.S. was the HOPE (“Helping 
Outstanding Pupils Educationally”) Scholarship program sponsored by the State of Georgia in   4
1993.  HOPE scholarships cover tuition, fees and book expenses for all eligible Georgia high 
school graduates enrolled in degree granting programs at publicly-funded two-year and four-
year institutions in Georgia.   HOPE scholars may also receive an award to attend a private 
degree granting institution in Georgia.  Eligibility requires high school graduation with a “B” 
average and scholarships are retained if a B average is maintained.  A household income cap 
was eliminated in 1995.  HOPE has now been copied by over a dozen states.   
  With regards to the first question that we pose in this paper, the U.S literature generally 
finds that merit aid attracts more students to the institutions (states) that offer it. There is less 
agreement on the source of such increased enrolments.   Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar (2006, 
p. 784) argue that programs like HOPE “primarily affect the choice of where, rather than 
whether, to attend college”.   In contrast, Dynarski (2008) has recently argued that merit aid 
programs substantially increase both the proportion of students who enter college and the 
completion rates of entrants. With regards to the second question that we pose in this paper, 
Dynarski (2000) used data from the 1988-1997 Current Population Surveys for states in the 
south-eastern U.S. and finds that HOPE increased the college attendance rates of all 18-19 year 
olds in Georgia by 7 percentage points.  She also found that this positive impact was limited 
primarily to youth from middle- and upper-income families and was greater among whites than 
among blacks.   In a subsequent paper, however, Dynarski (2004) attributed these two findings 
to relatively stringent academic requirements of the HOPE program and a now-changed 
provision that directed more generous scholarships to higher-income students.  She also   
reports that most merit aid programs have actually narrowed the enrolment gaps between racial 
groups. We have been unable to find any papers subsequent to Dynarski (2000) that focus 
specifically, as does ours, on differences by family income in the impact of merit aid on   5
student enrolments.    With regards to the third question that we pose in this paper, Cornwell 
and Mustard (2001) and Rubenstein and Scarifidi (2002) find that the distribution of the HOPE 
scholarship benefits is regressive in that expenditures from the HOPE program by county are 
positively correlated with the level of per capital income.  
 
3.  The Ontario University System 
 
3.1 Tuition and Entry Scholarships 
 
Virtually all universities in Ontario are publicly funded.  The two privately-funded 
universities in Ontario account for less than 1% of total enrollment in the province.
1  The 
universities range in size from a few thousand students in primarily undergraduate institutions 
to more than 50,000 in the major institutions. Variation in the quality of both programs and 
students exists but is limited.  For example, the most recent information in Maclean's university 
rankings indicates that the mean grade point averages of entering students range from 77 to 88 
percent across the universities.  All tuition fees were regulated in Ontario prior to the mid-
1990s.   Subsequently, a deregulation process started to allow individual institutions some 
freedom to set their own fees.  Deregulation was quite limited in general arts and science 
programs but was substantially more relaxed in professional programs, the two most prominent 
of which at the undergraduate level are Commerce and Engineering.  (See Frenette (2005) for a 
study of fee deregulation in postgraduate professional programs such as law and medicine).     
                                                 
1  Calculated by the authors from enrolment data provided on the websites of the private universities and the 
annual universities issue of  Maclean’s magazine.  For convenience, we henceforth use the term “Ontario 
university” to refer to the publicly-funded universities in the province. 
    6
As indicated in the Introduction, the Ontario university system is quite self-contained. 
This feature does not result from higher tuition for “out-of-province” students.  Canadian out of 
province students pay tuition that is either the same as or only slightly higher than that charged 
“in-province” students. (Fee differences for international students are much larger.)  Tuition for 
Arts and Science programs in Ontario was about 15% higher than the Canadian average 
throughout our data period.  The same was true for Commerce and Engineering at the start of 
our sample period but this differential increased to 40% following deregulation.  The highest 
tuition in Canada is in Nova Scotia and the lowest is in Quebec.   More important reasons for 
the self-contained nature of the Ontario system include the concentration of almost 40% of 
Canada’s population in Ontario, the large travel distances between provinces, and the 
Francophone character of most universities in Quebec which is the second largest province and 
the nearest neighbor to most of Ontario’s population.  
Figures 1a and 1b provide information concerning tuition and mandatory fees that has 
been assembled from a variety of data sources including the Council of Ontario Universities, 
university web sites, and the Statistics Canada Survey of Tuition and Living Costs.  (For the 
editor and referees, Table A-1 in the Appendix is the basis for these figures.)  Figure 1a 
provides the maximum, minimum and 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentiles of tuition and fees for 
students in programs in the Arts (Humanities and Social Sciences) and Sciences in 2001 
Canadian dollars.
2  The dollar values of each of these characteristics of the distribution 
increased by about 50% over our data period.  The range was $585 in 1994 and increased to  
                                                 
2 All dollars are 2001 Canadian dollars. The US-Canada exchange rate varied substantially over our data period.  
   7
$801 by 2005.  Figure 1b provides the same information for Commerce and Engineering.
3  In 
this case, the effect of deregulation is more apparent.  The values of both the 75
th percentile 
and the maximum value double while the increase is just over 50% at the 50
th percentile and 
below.  The range grew from $1245 to $4002 and the inter-quartile range increased from $228 
to $1777 which is much larger than the inter-quartile range of $265 for Arts and Sciences in 
2005. 
Financial support for students has a number of sources, some at the institutional level 
and some at provincial or national levels.  Ontario students can apply to a single source, the 
Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP), for provincial and federal grants and loans.   
Students are awarded financial support based on costs, student savings, student earnings and 
parental income.  Loans are interest-free while the recipient is a student and repayable only 
after graduation or discontinuing study.  Awards are portable between universities and 
programs though a cost of living allowance is added for students at schools more than 40 km. 
(25 miles) from home.  There are also portable entry scholarships and bursaries provided by 
high schools and private donors.  
Over our data period, Ontario universities substantially increased financial aid and     
new undergraduate scholarship support has primarily been in the form of automatic merit based 
scholarships.  The federal and Ontario governments have also expanded the amounts of 
repayable and non-repayable (grants, bursaries and scholarships) aid available to university 
students.  Both OSAP and the Ontario universities make strong efforts to ensure that financial 
aid from these two sources supplement rather than replace each other.  This is especially true in 
the case of non-repayable forms of aid.  To this end, the formula used to determine the amount 
                                                 
3 For each university and year, the level of tuition and fees are identical for Arts programs and Science programs. 
The same is not true for Commerce and Engineering programs.  The distribution of tuition and fees within these 
latter two programs are very similar, however, and this is why we have combined them in Figure 1b.    8
of repayable and non-repayable aid to which a student is entitled incorporates substantial 
exemptions for merit based entry awards.  In almost all cases, a merit-based entry scholarship 
will not reduce the amount of non-repayable aid available from government sources.
4  
We have collected individual scholarship data from a variety of sources including the 
annual INFO publication of the Ontario Universities Application Centre, the Maclean's 
Magazine Annual Report on Universities, individual university web sites, and personal 
communications with university administrators.  The proportion of university budgets devoted 
to scholarships and bursaries increased from 3.1% on average in 1994 to 5.2% in 1999 and to 
10.7% in 2005.  Some of this increase was due to a requirement of the funding Ministry that 
tuition increases be accompanied by increased student support.  The Ministry placed few 
restrictions, however, on the manner in which additional funds for scholarships were to be 
allocated.  The proportion of university budgets devoted to student services also increased but 
by a smaller amount from 4.5% on average in 1994 to 6.3% in 2005.   
The number of universities that offer merit-based entry awards for students with a GPA 
of 80 and above rose from 2 in 1994 to 13 (out of a total of 19) in 2005 and the number with an 
award for students with a GPA of 90 and above rose from 10 to 16.  At all institutions, the 
value of merit entry awards is the same across programs. We have calculated the expected 
value (base year2001) of a guaranteed entry scholarship for a student in the grade ranges of 80 
to 90 and 90 to 100 at each university including those that offer no guaranteed merit aid.
5  This 
expected value takes into account each university’s scholarship value at each GPA level and 
                                                 
4  The principal exception would be a student who receives both a merit based entry scholarship from the 
university and a scholarship from some other non-governmental source.  The current values of the exemptions for 
merit scholarships are $4400 for the federal and $3500 for provincial aid. 
5  Universities differ in their cutoff points.  For some institutions, 90 means 90.0 or better whereas for others this 
90 means 89.5 or better.  We have followed each university’s policies in our calculations but, for simplicity, use 
the terms 80-90 and 90-100 in our text.    9
the distribution of GPA’s of students who actually register in the university.   (For the editor 
and referees, Table A-2 in the Appendix contains these figures.)  For the 80-90 grade range, the 
median scholarship increased from $0 to $571 over our data period and the inter-quartile range 
grew from $216 to $954.  In the 90-100 grade range, the median almost doubled from $1156 to 
$2023 but the inter-quartile range actually decreased from $1734 to $1067.   
The key price variable that we use in our multivariate analysis is “net cost” which we 
have defined as tuition and mandatory fees minus the expected value of a guaranteed entry 




th percentiles for net cost for students with a GPA of from 80 to 
90 in the Arts and Sciences.  (For the editor and referees, table A-3 in the Appendix is the basis 
for these figures.)  Median net cost rose by about one-third.  The inter-quartile range increased 
from $398 to $1102 whereas the same difference for tuition and fees only rose from $188 to 
$265.  The range in net cost was little changed at about $1800. Figure 2b provides the same 
information for Commerce and Engineering.
6   In this case, the inter-quartile range increased 
by almost $1700 from $336 to $2035 and the range by almost $3000 from $2401 to $5331.  
Figures 2c and 2d show the distribution of expected net costs for students in the 90 to 100 
grade range. For Arts and Sciences, the inter-quartile range actually decreased slightly by about 
$300 from $1661 to $1364 but the range increased by over $1100 from $2292 to $3446.  In the 
case of Commerce and Engineering, the inter-quartile range increased by almost $700 from 
$1596 to $2287 and the range increased by $3833 from $3119 to $6952.  In summary, 
differences among universities in tuition and fees remained very modest in Arts and Sciences 
programs but grew significantly in the cases of Commerce and Engineering.  In all programs, 
                                                 
6 As in Figure 1b, we have combined the distributions for Commerce and Engineering because the individual 
distributions are so similar.    10
however, there were substantial increases in the differences among universities in the net cost 
for academically strong entering students.  
 
3.2  Our Sample  
 
All applicants to Ontario universities from Ontario high schools submit a common form 
to the Ontario Universities Application Centre in which they rank their choices of programs. 
Both mature Ontario applicants and non-Ontario applicants follow a different application 
procedure, are relatively small in number, and come from very heterogeneous academic 
backgrounds.  The application information and marks (provided directly by Ontario high 
schools) are forwarded by OUAC to each program and institution of choice, and OUAC later 
receives confirmation of the university, if any, at which the student has registered.  Our OUAC 
data file contains information about applications and registrations at Ontario universities, high 
school grades, and the student’s postal code at the time of application.      
Our full OUAC data set contains the records of all Ontario high school students who 
applied for admission to start in the fall of 1994 through the fall of 2005.  For this paper, we 
have chosen the subset of applicants who registered at an Ontario university during that time 
period.  We have also restricted our sample to those registrants who were students in high 
schools that offered the standard academic curriculum and who registered initially in a full-
time degree program.  These two restrictions eliminated only 3.1% of registrants leaving a 
sample of 537,801.  The restriction to schools with the standard academic curriculum means 
that we exclude students from such heterogeneous educational backgrounds as adult education 
centers, treatment schools, night schools, and special education schools.  Our sample includes   11
students from the secular school system, the publicly-funded separate (Roman Catholic) school 
system and a small number of privately-funded high schools.  The purpose of our restriction to 
registrants in full-time degree programs was to focus on students with relatively homogeneous 
educational aspirations.   
Our data period witnessed a major secondary curriculum change that shortened the 
number of years of high school for university bound students from five years to four.   This 
resulted in two cohorts of high school students having a normal graduation date in June of 
2003 (commonly known as the “double cohort” year).  Under the pre-2003 system, students 
would normally progress to university after 13 years of schooling, but outstanding students 
could proceed after 12 years and some students would take 14 years.  After the curriculum 
change, it became very difficult to graduate before the normal time of 12 years but it was still 
possible and not uncommon to take an extra year.  
 Table 1 provides basic summary statistics on our sample.  Column 2 indicates that the 
number of registrants was relatively stable in the 1990’s but started to increase markedly in 
2002 both in absolute terms and as a percent of 19 year olds (see column 3) with what appears 
to be the arrival of an unusually large number of students who completed an academic high 
school degree in only four years under the old system to avoid the “double cohort” year.  The 
number of registrants declines after 2003 but remains substantially above the levels at the turn 
of the century.  The number of registrants in 2004 (relative to 2001 or even to 2002) likely 
reflects some students who postponed registration for a year in order to avoid the big entry 
cohort of 2003.  The effect of the double cohort is also shown in Column 3 where the ratio of 
registrants to 19 year-olds grew from about 26% to 30%.   One feature of our data that changed 
little over our sample period was the fraction of applicants who register (not shown in Table 1)   12
which stayed constant at about 70% with much higher percentages (85 to 86%) for students 
with averages of 80 and over and 90 and over. 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 demonstrate the increasing proportions of students being 
awarded high school grade averages of 80% or better and 90% or better.
7  This suggests some 
grade inflation given that the same or an increasing fraction of the relevant age group registers 
each year (except for the 2003 to 2004 drop after the double cohort year).  The noticeably 
improved grades in the double cohort year of 2003 likely reflect both increased selectivity as 
universities select the better applicants and some additional grade inflation.  That the higher 
marks seem concentrated in the 80s and not the 90s suggests that it is mainly selection.
8   
The second of the three questions that we are considering in this paper is whether or not 
the responsiveness of academically strong students to merit entry scholarships varies by 
socioeconomic background.  The third of the three questions that we are considering is whether 
or not the benefits of merit aid are conferred disproportionately on students from different 
socioeconomic backgrounds.  The OUAC data do not contain family income information but 
they do contain the postal code that can be linked to the 2001 Census Dissemination Area (DA) 
in which the family resides.  The DA is a small, relatively stable geographic unit with a 
population of 400 to 700 persons.  It is the smallest standard geographic area for which all 
Canadian census data are disseminated.  In order to consider socioeconomic differences among 
OUAC applicants and registrants, we first calculated the equivalent average household income
9 
                                                 
7 Grade averages (GPAs) are calculated from grades submitted by the high schools to the Application Centre.  
These are calculated as the average of the best 6 courses needed for university admission in Ontario.   
8 If teachers were giving better grades to ‘help’ students in the double cohort year one might have expected the 
increases to have been throughout the distribution. 
 
9 Equivalent average household income is equal to average household income divided by the square root of the 
average number of persons per household in the DA.  This is analogous to a common measure of equivalent 
household income, that is, household income divided by the square root of the number of persons in the 
household.    13
in each DA.  We then determined the 33rd ($53,500) and 67
th ($77,000) percentiles of the 
distribution of all postal codes in Ontario when ranked by the equivalent average household 
income of the 2001 Census Dissemination Area with which the postal code is most strongly 
associated.
10  The resulting terciles are labeled as low, middle and high-income.  To keep the 
ranking of the postal codes constant over the data period, we rely on the average income data 
as provided in the 2001 Census.
11   
The third of the three questions that we pose in this paper concerns the distribution of 
the benefits of merit aid across students from different socioeconomic backgrounds. Our data 
reveal that university registrants come disproportionately from higher income neighbourhoods.  
In 2001, 40% of all Ontarians age 15-24 lived in low-income DA‘s and 35% in high-income 
DA’s.  In the same year, only 22% of registrants in our data set lived in low-income DA‘s and 
45% lived in high-income DA’s.   This result is consistent with the findings from HOPE and 
other U.S. merit aid programs (Cornwell and Mustard 2001 and Rubenstein and Scarifidi 
2002).  Our data, however, also permitted us to calculate the proportions of students with grade 
averages of 80% or better and 90% or better (as in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1) by DA income 
tercile.  When we did so (not shown here), we found very similar results for low, middle and 
high income neighborhoods. (For the editor and referees, please see table A-4 in the 
Appendix.)  In most years, the difference between low-income and high-income neighborhoods 
in the proportion of registrants with a GPA of 90 and over is 1-2 percentage points.  In the case 
of registrants with a GPA of 80 and over this difference is slightly larger in absolute terms (3-4 
percentage points) but about the same in relative terms.  These differences show no sign of an 
                                                 
10 Some postal codes cross DA boundaries but our data identify that DA which contains the largest proportion of 




th percentiles of the distribution of 
average DA family incomes in 2001 dollars are as follows:  $39,000, $49,000, $64,500, $84,500, and $109,000. 
11  This might havc raised concerns if the tercile ranking changed significantly over time but it does not as we 
found by comparing the 2001 terciles with terciles based on the 1996 census.  They were very similar.   14
upward trend over time.  Hence, merit aid appears to favour more economically privileged 
students in Ontario largely because such students are more likely to attend university. 
Conditional on registration, however, the differences in the proportions of students from low-
income and high-income areas that would qualify for a merit-based entry scholarship at a given 
university are small.  (The same is true of applicants.)  A different picture might be painted, of 
course, by a data set with information on total scholarship aid granted and/or individual family 
income.  
 
4.  Multivariate Analysis 
 
In this section we present regression estimates of the impact of net cost on the share of 
high-performing registrants that a university is able to attract.  Table 2 illustrates the 
distribution of these shares across universities for 1994 and 2005 which are typical of other 
years in our sample.  The mean share for Arts, Sciences and Commerce is 5.3% or simply one 
divided by the number of universities (19).
12  The mean share for Engineering is either 7.7% or 
7.1% because five universities do not have this program and one initiated its first Engineering 
program in 2001.
13  The Engineering students are somewhat more concentrated than students 
in other programs.  We also note that the raw data reveal frequent changes in the ordering of 
the universities by share of students including which university lies in first place. As indicated 
by Table 2, the value of the shares of students across universities varies considerably and, 
                                                 
12 Brock, Carleton, Guelph, Lakehead, Laurentian (including Algoma), McMaster, Nipissing, Ottawa, Queen’s, 
Ryerson, Toronto (Mississauga), Toronto (St. George), Toronto (Scarborough), Trent, Waterloo, Western Ontario, 
Wilfred Laurier, Windsor, and York. 
13 Brock, Nipissing, Toronto (Scarborough), Trent, and Wilfred Laurier do not have Engineering programs. York 
initiated an Engineering program in 2001.   15
hence, we use the natural logarithm of this proportion as the dependent variable in our 
regressions.   
Our expectation is that students from low-income areas would be more sensitive to 
price than would students from high-income areas.  Hence, we include dummies for these 
variables interacted with net cost in our regressions.  We also include measures of three 
additional determinants of a university’s share of registrants.  One is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the student lives within 40 kilometres (about 25 miles) of the 
university at which she registers as measured by the centroids for the postal code of the 
student’s permanent residence.  Forty kilometres is the distance that the Ontario Student 
Assistance Program
14 uses to distinguish between commuting and non-commuting students in 
its aid formula.  Fifty-two percent of students in our sample have permanent residences 40 
kilometres or more from their university and this changed little over our sample period.    
We also use two measures from the annual Maclean’s issue on Canadian universities 
that may be especially relevant to students, namely, the proportion of the operating budget that 
the university spends on scholarships and bursaries and the proportion of the operating budget 
that the university spends on student services.  Over our sample period the mean value of the 
former proportion increased from 3.1% to 10.7% and the mean value of the latter proportion 
from 4.5% to 6.3%. 
15  
                                                 
14 The Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP) is the provincial agency that disburses bursaries and loans to 
students in Ontario.  A student selecting a university more than 40 kilometres from his or her home is eligible for 
a living allowance, 
15 As noted in Section 2, three previous papers have used the rankings of universities by Maclean’s magazine in 
their analyses.  We do not do so for three reasons.  First, the Maclean’s rankings are within three categories:  
Medical/Doctoral, Comprehensive and Primarily Undergraduate.  There is no ranking of universities across the 
categories.  That is why two of the previous papers used rankings within categories and the third analysed the 
impact of changes in rank.  We do not believe that either strategy is appropriate for our analysis. Our interest is in 
academically strong students who would typically meet the admission and entry award qualifications at a wide 
range of institutions and, hence, be considering options across the Maclean’s categories.  In addition, we focus on 
the cost of attending different institutions.  Students are concerned with the level of such costs and not recent   16
Due to the large differences in net cost for students with different grades, we estimate 
separate regressions for students in two different ranges of GPA:  80-90 and 90-100.  We also 
estimated these regressions separately by program due to the differences in tuition and grade 
distributions across programs.  For example, engineering programs tend to be both costly and 
attract students with high grades, a fact that might lead a simple regression with all programs 
combined to indicate, erroneously, that high cost attracts more good students. Students in Arts 
and those in Science face similar tuition and fee schedules but have different GPAs and, hence, 
different expected entry scholarships.  For each grade range (80-90 and 90-100) and academic 
program (Arts, Science, Commerce and Engineering) we estimate the following regression 
equation:  
 
(1) Ln (Prop)ijkt =  β0 + β1 Ln Relative Net Costit + β2  Ln Relative Net Costit*Low Income + β3  
Ln Relative Net Costit*High Income + β4 Low Income   + β5 High Income + β6 Distant  + β7 Ln 
Prop Scholarshipsit + β8 Ln Prop Student Servicesit + β9*Ui + ε ijkt   where 
 
Propijkt = proportion of the annual total of registrants at the i
th university and in the j
th 
neighbourhood income category (high, middle, low), the k
th distance-to-university category 
(more than 40 kilometeres or not), and the t
th year.  Formally,  Propijkt =  Regijkt  / ( 3ijk Regijkt ) 
where Reg stands for the number of registrants.  
 
Relative Net Costit = net cost (tuition plus mandatory fees minus expected
16 value of a 
guaranteed entry scholarship) at the i
th university in the t
th year relative to the provincial 
average net cost for the same year (and program and grade range).  
 
Low Income = dummy variable equal to 1 for low neighbourhood-income categories and equal 
to 0 otherwise 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
changes therein.  Second, the Maclean’s rankings are quite stable over our data period.  We wish to include a 
university fixed effect in our regressions to control for unobserved and unchanging institutional characteristics. 
These fixed effects and the Maclean’s rankings are quite collinear.  Third, we have divided the University of 
Toronto into its three separate campuses for our analysis. We believe that this approach is clearly justified 
indicated by the separate admissions procedures and differences among entering students at these campuses.  
Maclean’s, however, does not provide separate rankings for these three campuses.   
 
16 See the earlier discussion on page 8 about what is meant by ‘expected’ in this context.   17
High Income = dummy variable equal to 1 for high neighbourhood-income categories and 
equal to 0 otherwise 
 
Distant = dummy variable equal to 1 for the “live 40 kilometres or more away” category and 
equal to 0 otherwise  
 
Prop Scholarship it = proportion of the operating budget spent on scholarships and bursaries at 
the i
th university in the t
th year 
 
Prop Student Servicesit = proportion of the operating budget spent on student services at the i
th 
university in the t
th year 
 
Ui = vector of dummy variables for each university (save that in omitted case), the estimates 
for which are not reported in this paper due to the nature of our data sharing agreement. 
 
ε ijkt = error term  
 
There are no time dummies in the regression due to the nature of our dependent 
variable.  In each year and grade range, there are 114 observations (19 universities, 2 distance 
categories and 3 income categories) for Arts, Science and Commerce.   Engineering has 78 
observations (13 universities) prior to 2001 and 84 observations (14 universities) thereafter.  
Arts, Science, Commerce and Engineering are by far the largest categories in the classification 
system for academic programs recognized by OUAC.  However, there are other categories 
such as Architecture, Nursing, Education and Agriculture.  For the regressions reported below, 
we have assigned all registrants in our sample to one of our four basic programs.  For example, 
Nursing and Agriculture registrants were reassigned to Science and Architecture registrants 
were reassigned to Engineering.   We have also estimated the same regressions as in Table 3 
using only those registrants whose initial classification was one of Arts, Science, Commerce 
and Engineering.  These more narrowly defined samples yielded very similar estimates to those 
reported below.    18
Before proceeding to the regression results, it is appropriate to discuss several 
limitations of our analysis.  Universities compete vigorously for academically strong students 
for many reasons including the fact that such students are more pleasant to teach, help weaker 
students, strengthen the university’s appeal to donors, and will ultimately become, on average, 
more influential and affluent alumni.  Entry scholarships provide only one method of 
competing for such students.  Alternative methods include other types of scholarships and 
bursaries, the quality and diversity of academic programs, co-op programs, and many non-
academic features of university life such as preferred access to student housing, athletic and 
social facilities, exchange programs, etc.  All such lures are costly and a decision to spend 
more on entry scholarships must, at least in some short run, lead to tradeoffs with other costs or 
services.  As indicated above, our expectation is that entry scholarships would be more 
effective in attracting students from lower income backgrounds.  The corollary of this 
expectation is that students from higher income backgrounds will give relatively greater weight 
to the other features of university life listed above.   
One shortcoming of our analysis is that we do not have good measures for many of the 
factors other than entry scholarships that likely influence the enrolment decisions of 
academically strong students.  This shortcoming is typical of the literature cited in our review 
in Section 2.  A second shortcoming of our analysis is that of possible endogeneity, that is, a 
university may decide to initiate or enrich entry scholarships as a consequence of a declining 
share of academically strong students.  In constructing our data set we have been careful to 
match the timing of the variables so as to minimize this problem, i.e., the net cost variable is 
based on the tuition, fees and scholarships that students would have observed at the time of 
application in a given year.  We believe that both of these problems also characterize much of   19
the literature in this area.  For example, the initiation of the HOPE scholarships (or similar 
scholarships in other states) can be thought of as an policy change (possibly in response to 
enrolment trends) that altered the terms of competition for good students both among 
universities in Georgia and between universities in Georgia and other regions that traditionally 
attracted students from Georgia.   We would expect that both Georgia universities and their 
traditional competitors would alter other aspects of their costs, programs and services in an 
effort to maintain and increase their share of strong students.   
Papers in the HOPE literature have at best very limited measures of the changes in such 
university costs, programs and services that were induced by the institution of the HOPE and 
related scholarships.  Similarly, our sample period witnessed a major policy change in Ontario, 
that is, the institution of tuition and fee deregulation and the accompanying requirement to 
allocate a certain fraction of revenues to financial aid. This policy change, in turn, has altered 
the terms of competition for good students among Ontario universities and stimulated a series 
of changes in the various programs, services and costs that these universities use to attract such 
students.  As in the HOPE literature, our ability to measure and model the effects of the various 
university responses to the initial public policy change is limited.  Also as in the HOPE 
literature, the problem of identifying the causal effects of changes in scholarship policy at 
either the university or state level is one not easily solved with the available data.. 
We report the regression results for registrants in Arts and Sciences programs in Table 
3 and for registrants in Commerce and Engineering in Table 4.  Our pattern of reporting is the 
same across all four programs.  In the first two columns we report the results for the registrants 
with a high school average in the 80-90 range and in the last two columns we report the results 
for the registrants with a high school average in the 90-100 range. For each grade range, we   20
report the results from two specifications.  The first specification allows the net cost measure to 
have a similar effect across all groups of students.  The second specification allows the net cost 
to have a different effect across the three income groupings (low, middle, and high).  We have 
measured both the dependent variable and the continuous independent variables in natural 
logarithms and, hence, can interpret the coefficients as elasticities, that is, the relative 
proportionate changes in the dependent and independent variables. In the text, we shall refer to 
estimates with a p-value of 0.10 or less as “significant”.   
The coefficients for the non-cost variables in Tables 3 and 4 are, in most instances, 
quite similar. Hence, we will comment on them before moving on to consider the net cost 
coefficients.  The first non-cost variable is an indicator of the type of neighborhood from which 
a registrant has come (low, middle or high income).  We use the middle income neighborhood 
as the omitted category.  Across all specifications and programs, the sign of the coefficients are 
similar.  The coefficients for the low-income dummy variable are always significantly negative 
and imply that registrants from these neighborhoods, other things equal, constitute a proportion 
of students in this grade range that is from 50% to 80% smaller than that of the students from 
middle-income neighborhoods.  In contrast, the high-income neighborhood coefficients are 
usually close to zero in value and not significantly different from the omitted category (middle 
income).   The one exception is in the case of Science students for whom the high-income 
neighborhood coefficients are significantly negative but still small in absolute value. 
We also include a measure based on the students’ home residences being within 40 
kilometers of the university.  For the Arts programs, students whose home residence is more 
than 40 kilometres from their university constitute a significantly greater share of registrants in 
both grade ranges than do students who live closer to campus.  For other programs, however,   21
the distance coefficient is not significant for the 80-90 grade range and is significantly negative 
for the 90-100 grade range.  Hence, there is no consistent pattern for this variable.  The 
coefficients for the proportion of operating budgets spent on scholarships and the proportion 
spent on student services are usually positive, as expected, but small and not significant.  The 
only exceptions are the (positive) coefficients for the proportion of operating budgets spent on 
scholarships on the share of Science students in the 90-100 grade range and the proportion 
spent on student services on the share of Commerce students in 90-100 grade ranges.  
We now turn to the cost coefficients and begin with the specification that allows the net 
cost to have a similar effect across all groups of students in the 80-90 range (column 1 for each 
of the programs).  Across all of the specifications, this coefficient is positive but not 
significantly different from zero.  In contrast, the coefficient on the net cost measure for the 
students in the 90-100 range (column 3), is negative and statistically significant.  For Arts, 
Science, and Commerce, the cost elasticity is modest ranging from -0.085 to -.129.  The cost 
elasticity is quite large for Engineering, -0.86, indicating that registrations in Engineering 
programs are quite sensitive to changes in the relative tuition cost.  Hence, the answer to the 
first of the three questions that we are considering in this paper is that, with one exception, 
merit scholarships have at most a small effect on the ability of an individual university to 
increase its share of academically strong students.  As indicated in Section 2, the U.S. literature 
has generally found that merit aid does have an impact of where students attend university.  
When allow the effect of the net cost to vary across the income groupings, we observe 
significant differences in the cost elasticities.  Across all programs, the coefficient on net cost 
(row 1) reflects the effect of change in the net cost for registrants from middle income 
neighborhoods.  The additional effect for low income neighborhoods is reported in row 7 and   22
the additional effect for high income neighborhoods is reported in row 9.  For ease of 
interpretation, we report in rows 8 and 10, respectively the total effect (row 1 plus either row 7 
or row 9) of a change in net cost for these income groups.  In row 11, we report the difference 
between the high and low income interaction coefficients (row 9 minus row 7). 
For Arts students in the 80-90 grade range, the net cost effect for the middle income is 
not significant.    For the low income group, both the interaction coefficient and the total net 
cost effect are negative and significant with an elasticity of 0.54 when the two terms are 
combined.  For the high-income group, the interaction coefficient and the total cost effect are 
positive and significant with a combined elasticity of 1.56.  The difference between the 
interaction coefficients for the high-income and low-income neighbourhoods is positive which 
suggests that an increase in net cost at a university will lead to an increase in the ratio of the 
share of students from high-income neighborhoods to the share of students from low-income 
neighborhoods.   
Our expectation was that a high net cost would have a more negative effect on students 
from low-income areas than on students from high-income areas.  What Table 3 shows for Arts 
students in the 80-90 grade range is that a higher net cost is associated with an increased 
proportion of students from high-income areas.    One possibility, as indicated in our discussion 
above, is that guaranteed entry scholarships channel funds away from other services that high-
income students value more greatly, e.g., smaller classes, better facilities, etc.  Note that we do 
include the Maclean’s measures of the proportions of the operating budget devoted to 
scholarships and student services but these likely miss many important aspects of student life.
17    
                                                 
17 Maclean’s does have measures of class size but, unfortunately, these measures are not consistent over our data 
period.      23
For Arts students in the 90-100 grade range, both interaction coefficients and total cost 
effects are negative though only the interaction term for the low-income students and the total 
net cost effect for high-income students are significant.  This is the only instance in Table 3 in 
which the difference between the interaction coefficients is not significant and, hence, do not 
indicate that an increase in net cost will lead to an increase in the ratio of the share of students 
from high-income neighborhoods to the share of students from low-income neighborhoods.   
The estimates for Science students in the 80-90 grade range are similar to those for Arts 
students in the same grade range in the following ways: the net cost effect for the middle 
income is not significant; both the interaction term and the total net cost effect are negative 
(positive) for the low (high) income group; and higher net cost is associated with an increase in 
the ratio of the share of students from high-income neighborhoods to the share of students from 
low-income neighborhoods.   For Science students in the 90-100 grade range, the total net cost 
effect for students from both middle and low income neighbourhoods is significantly negative.  
The interaction coefficient for the high income group is positive and significantly different 
from zero but the total cost effect for this group is not.  Once again, though, an increase in net 
cost is associated with an increase in the ratio of the share of students from high-income 
neighborhoods to the share of students from low-income neighborhoods.   
The net cost estimates for Commerce students in the 80-90 grade range in Table 4 are 
also similar to those for Arts and Science students in the same grade range.  For the low 
income group, the interaction coefficient is negative and almost significant by our standard (p-
value = 0.11) but the total net cost effect is not significant. For the high income group, both the 
interaction term and the total net cost effect are positive and significant.  These results suggest 
the familiar effect of an increase in net cost on the mix of students from high-income and low-  24
income neighborhoods.  The results for Commerce students in the 90-100 grade range are 
similar to those for such students in the 80-90 grade range. The key difference is that, for the 
90-100 group, the total cost effects for middle and low income groups are significant though 
the total cost effect for the high income group is not.  
For Engineering registrants in the 80-90 grade range (Table 4), the total net cost effect 
is not significant for any income group.  For the 90-100 students, the total net cost effects are 
negative and significant for the middle- and low-income groups but not significant for the 
high-income category.  For Engineering students in both grade ranges, an increase in net cost 
will raise the share of students from high-income neighborhoods relative to those from low-
income areas  
In summary, with regard to the second of the three questions considered in this paper, 
the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 commonly indicate that, higher net cost is associated with a 
decrease in a university’s share of students from low-income areas and an increase in the share 
from high-income areas.  Our most robust finding is that a higher net cost is associated with an 
increase in the proportion of students from high-income areas relative to the proportion from 
low-income areas.  Furthermore, the size of this effect is always substantially larger for the 80-
90 grade range than for the 90-100 range.  One possible reason for this is that universities 
differ less in net cost for the top grade group once non-guaranteed entry scholarships are taken 
into account.  That is to say, many students in the 90-100 range anticipate and receive 
substantial scholarships whether guaranteed or not.
18  As indicated in Section 2, the U.S. 
literature has typically focused on racial rather than income differences in the response to merit 
aid.  The evidence is that most merit aid programs have narrowed the enrolment gaps between 
                                                 
18 We also experimented with models in which the distance dummy variable was interacted with net cost and the 
low-income and high-income variables.  This specification increases substantially the number of parameters to be 
estimated and does not offer any systematic additional insights.     25
racial groups.  This implies a more positive response to merit aid from groups with lower 




5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
The past decade witnessed steady increases in the real cost of tuition and fees at Ontario 
universities especially in professional programs such as Commerce and Engineering.  These 
cost hikes were accompanied by large increases in financial aid often in the form of merit-
based entry scholarships. This form of financial aid was not the norm at Ontario universities in 
the mid-1990’s but now is offered by most such institutions.  Over this period there have been 
increases not only in the average value of such scholarships but in the variation among 
universities in the value of such merit aid.  Virtually all Ontario universities are publicly 
funded and the system is quite self-contained.  Hence, the main purpose of these scholarships is 
not to keep high ability students in the province but to attract academically strong students to 
the individual institution by lowering the net cost of attendance.   
We use data from the Ontario Universities Application Centre on student registrations 
from 1994 through 2005 to examine three questions.  Does a lower net cost enable an Ontario 
university to attract a greater share of academically strong high school students?   Does the 
impact of net cost on attendance vary by the socioeconomic background of the student?  Is 
merit aid of disproportionate benefit to students from more privileged socioeconomic 
backgrounds?      26
Our regression estimates indicate no significant relationship between the net cost 
(tuition minus merit aid) of attending a given university relative to its competitors and the 
overall share of high school applicants with a high school grade average in the 80-90 range that 
the university is able to attract.  For students in the 90-100 grade range, however, we find a 
significant and modest-sized cost elasticity of about -0.10 in value for students in Arts, 
Science, and Commerce.  For the Engineering students in this top grade range, however, the 
cost elasticity is -0.86.  Hence the answer to our first question is that, with one exception, merit 
scholarships have at most a small effect on the ability of a university to increase its share of 
academically strong students.   
To answer our second question, we also estimated our regressions with interactions 
between net cost and the average income level of the neighbourhood in which the student’s 
family resides.  In the majority of cases, we find higher net cost is associated with a decrease in 
a university’s share of students from low-income areas and an increase in the share from high-
income areas.  One interpretation of the positive effect of higher costs on students from high-
income neighbourhoods is that guaranteed entry scholarships channel funds away from other 
services that high-income students value more greatly, e.g., smaller classes, better facilities, 
etc.  Our most robust finding is that a higher net cost is associated with an increase in the 
proportion of students from high-income areas relative to the proportion from low-income 
areas.  In other words, merit aid influences not so much the number as the type of academically 
strong students that a university can attract.   
To answer our final question, the data reveal that university registrants do indeed come 
disproportionately from higher income neighbourhoods.  Conditional upon university 
registration, however, the differences in the proportions of students from low-income and high-  27
income neighbourhoods that qualify for a merit-based entry scholarship at a given university is 
only one or two percentage points. Hence, among those students who make it to university, 
merit aid does not appear to be of disproportionate benefit to those from more economically 
advantaged backgrounds.     28
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max(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year Number of Registrants / % Registrants % Registrants
Registrants 19 year olds* with GPA 80+ with GPA 90+
1994 38972 27% 50% 9%
1995 38199 26% 52% 9%
1996 38933 27% 53% 10%
1997 38386 27% 55% 11%
1998 38928 26% 55% 11%
1999 41138 27% 55% 12%
2000 40250 26% 57% 13%
2001 42101 26% 57% 13%
2002 49168 30% 59% 14%
2003 68958 41% 66% 15%
2004 50552 30% 62% 13%
2005 52216 31% 62% 14%
Table 1
*Number 19 year olds is from Statistics Canada Intercensal Projections.
Year One Registrants  at Ontario UniversitiesMin 25th 50th 75th Max Min 25th 50th 75th Max
1994 0.6% 2.2% 4.2% 6.2% 17.3% 0.0% 9.9% 4.3% 7.1% 15.6%
2005 1.0% 2.2% 5.4% 6.6% 13.7% 1.1% 13.6% 3.6% 7.9% 14.9%
1994 0.2% 1.4% 3.4% 11.6% 14.8% 0.1% 0.9% 2.2% 9.9% 22.3%
2005 0.4% 1.7% 3.7% 8.6% 14.8% 0.4% 1.0% 2.6% 9.0% 19.1%
1994 0.1% 2.0% 4.4% 8.4% 17.1% 0.0% 0.7% 2.3% 12.2% 22.3%
2005 0.4% 1.6% 4.9% 8.9% 11.7% 0.0% 0.6% 1.8% 9.3% 19.1%
1994 0.5% 4.6% 7.1% 10.3% 20.0% 0.2% 1.8% 3.5% 7.2% 34.1%
2005 0.2% 2.0% 5.7% 9.6% 26.1% 0.2% 0.8% 2.3% 8.0% 36.7%
Commerce 80-90 Commerce 90+
Engineering 80-90 Engineering 90+
Arts 80-90 Arts 90+
Table 2  
Percentiles Percentiles
Science 80-90 Science 90+
Distribution of Student Shares by Grade Level, Program and Year(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Faculty
Grade Range
(1) (Natural Log of ) Net Cost  0.34 0.01 -0.12* -0.05 0.28 0.30 -0.13*** -0.18***
Relative to Provincial Average (0.35) (0.99) (0.10) (0.53) (0.60) (0.63) (0.00) (0.00)
(2) Low Income Census Dissemination Area -0.50*** -0.51*** -0.81*** -0.84*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.50*** -0.50***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(3) High Income Census Dissemination Area -0.026 -0.01 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.15** -0.13*
(0.48) (0.84) (0.29) (0.27) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.06)
(4) Lives at least 40 kilometers from campus 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.07 0.07 -0.38*** -0.38***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00)
(5) (Natural Log of ) Proportion of Operating  0.13 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.60*** 0.60***
Budget Spent on Scholarships (0.14) (0.14) (0.51) (0.51) (0.31) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00)
(6) (Natural Log of) Proportion of Operating  0.04 0.04 0.27 0.27 -0.07 -0.07 0.20 0.20
Budget Spent on Student Services (0.60) (0.60) (0.22) (0.22) (0.75) (0.75) (0.24) (0.25)
(7) Interaction of Net Cost with Low Income  -0.55*** -0.11** -1.17** 0.03
Dissemination Area (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.64)
(8) Net Cost plus Low Income Interaction  -0.54* -0.16 -0.87* -0.15***
(1) + (7) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.00)
(9) Interaction of Net Cost with HIgh Income  1.56*** -0.09 1.10* 0.12*
Dissemination Area (0.00) (0.29) (0.06) (0.06)
(10) Net Cost plus High Income Interaction  1.57** -0.14** 1.40* -0.05
(1) + (9) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.24)
(11) High Income Interaction minus Low  2.11*** 0.03 2.27*** 0.10**
Income Interaction (9) - (7) (0.00) (0.83) (0.00) (0.02)
Number of observations 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386 1386
p-values in parentheses *p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Table 3
Regressions for Impact of Net Cost on the Share of Registrants:  Arts and Science
80-90 90-100 80-90 90-100
Arts Science(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Faculty
Grade Range
(1) (Natural Log of ) Net Cost  0.52 0.45 -0.08** -0.09** 0.09 0.08 -0.86** -0.84**
Relative to Provincial Average (0.22) (0.34) (0.02) (0.04) (0.91) (0.93) (0.02) (0.02)
(2) Low Income Census Dissemination Area -0.51*** -0.53*** -0.55*** -0.58*** -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.75*** -0.78***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(3) High Income Census Dissemination Area 0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.09 0.06 0.09* 0.07 0.09
(0.88) (0.65) (0.43) (0.53) (0.18) (0.05) (0.40) (0.29)
(4) Lives at least 40 kilometers from campus -0.01 -0.01 -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.33*** -0.33***
(0.87) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.75) (0.00) (0.00)
(5) (Natural Log of ) Proportion of Operating  0.24 0.24 -0.15 -0.15 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.06
Budget Spent on Scholarships (0.27) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.89) (0.89) (0.79) (0.79)
(6) (Natural Log of) Proportion of Operating  0.27 0.27 0.80** 0.80** 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22
Budget Spent on Student Services (0.29) (0.29) (0.02) (0.02) (0.28) (0.28) (0.42) (0.42)
(7) Interaction of Net Cost with Low Income  -0.61 -0.13* -0.77 -0.26
Dissemination Area (0.11) (0.06) (0.14) (0.29)
(8) Net Cost plus Low Income Interaction  -0.16 -0.22* -0.69 -1.09**
(12) + (18) (0.77) (0.00) (0.34) (0.02)
(9) Interaction of Net Cost with HIgh Income  0.83** 0.13* 0.79* 0.19
Dissemination Area (0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.49)
(10) Net Cost plus High Income Interaction  1.28 0.05 0.87 -0.65
(12) + (20) (0.01) (0.49) (0.20) (0.11)
(11) High Income Interaction minus Low  1.44** 0.27** 1.55** 0.44*
Income Interaction (20) - (18) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10)
Number of observations 1386 1386 1386 1386 966 966 966 966
p-values in parentheses *p<0.10,  **p<0.05,  ***p<0.01
Table 4
Regressions for Impact of Net Cost on the Share of Registrants:  Commerce and Engineering
80-90 90-100 80-90 90-100
Commerce Engineeringmean p50 min p25 p75 max p75‐p25 max‐min
94 2982 2975 2730 2860 3048 3315 188 585
95 3194 3154 2997 3140 3290 3530 150 532
96 3690 3658 3453 3630 3779 4010 149 557
97 3962 3915 3724 3849 4037 4253 188 529
98 4247 4224 3985 4132 4354 4595 223 611
99 4521 4487 4220 4393 4626 4873 233 653
00 4562 4520 4304 4444 4724 4941 280 637
01 4526 4504 4278 4416 4570 4933 154 655
02 4543 4539 4303 4467 4597 4930 130 627
03 4569 4551 4245 4424 4746 4949 322 704
04 4499 4459 4165 4372 4644 4928 272 763
05 4444 4411 4080 4311 4576 4882 265 801
mean p50 min p25 p75 max p75‐p25 max‐min
94 3107 3071 2730 2968 3196 3975 228 1245
95 3321 3290 2997 3152 3395 4363 244 1366
96 3833 3806 3453 3658 3955 4962 297 1509
97 4117 4078 3724 3915 4211 5253 296 1530
98 4440 4399 3985 4231 4595 5559 364 1574
99 4878 4781 4220 4487 5030 6237 543 2017
00 4971 4795 4304 4598 5231 6362 633 2058
Table A-1a
Tuition and Fees for Arts and Sciences (CDN$2001)
Table A-1b
Tuition and Fees for Commerce and Engingeering (CDN$2001)
00 4971 4795 4304 4598 5231 6362 633 2058
01 5146 4904 4278 4570 5753 6537 1183 2259
02 5272 4920 4303 4597 5896 7176 1299 2873
03 5580 4954 4245 4613 6469 8393 1857 4148
04 5491 4864 4165 4511 6371 8219 1860 4054
05 5414 4823 4080 4530 6307 8082 1777 4002mean p50 min p25 p75 max p75-p25 max-min
1994 171 0 0 0 216 1156 216 1156
1995 166 0 0 0 211 1128 211 1128
1996 257 0 0 0 561 1111 561 1111
1997 313 0 0 0 770 1091 770 1091
1998 472 209 0 0 1021 1598 1021 1598
1999 615 700 0 0 1060 1567 1060 1567
2000 726 879 0 212 1093 1524 881 1524
2001 721 858 0 144 1182 1478 1038 1478
2002 715 841 0 141 1158 1448 1018 1448
2003 609 631 0 137 955 1291 818 1291
2004 566 582 0 135 916 1448 782 1448
2005 632 571 0 132 1086 1467 954 1467
mean p50 min p25 p75 max p75-p25 max-min
1994 956 1156 0 0 1734 2139 1734 2139
1995 933 1128 0 0 1692 2087 1692 2087
1996 1049 1111 0 0 1906 2446 1906 2446
1997 1416 1500 0 660 2182 2728 1522 2728
1998 1676 1730 0 865 2354 3243 1490 3243
1999 1977 1818 0 961 2807 4770 1846 4770
2000 2047 2062 0 1547 2730 4640 1184 4640
2001 1873 2000 0 1500 2645 4000 1145 4000
2002 1836 1960 0 1470 2593 3920 1123 3920
2003 1802 1910 0 1433 2346 3820 914 3820
2004 1801 1954 0 1406 2343 3748 937 3748
2005 1921 2023 223 1379 2446 3676 1067 3453
Table A-2b
Expected Scholarship 90-100 for All Programs (CDN$2001)
Expected Scholarship 80-90 for All Programs (CDN$2001)
Table A-2amean p50 min p25 p75 max p75‐p25 max‐min
94 2811 2957 1574 2597 2995 3315 398 1741
95 3027 3154 1870 2812 3238 3530 426 1659
96 3433 3638 2402 3136 3738 4010 602 1608
97 3649 3915 2682 3035 4024 4128 989 1446
98 3775 4165 2396 3111 4284 4427 1173 2030
99 3906 3969 2704 3290 4487 4801 1197 2096
00 3836 3744 2780 3359 4466 4764 1107 1984
01 3806 3751 2875 3313 4446 4717 1133 1842
02 3828 3771 2901 3323 4403 4719 1080 1818
03 3959 3841 2954 3649 4551 4750 902 1796
04 3933 3957 2898 3581 4459 4644 878 1746
05 3812 3897 2751 3298 4401 4576 1102 1825
mean p50 min p25 p75 max p75‐p25 max‐min
94 2958 2975 1574 2860 3196 3975 336 2401
95 3175 3238 1870 3043 3391 4363 348 2493
96 3603 3658 2402 3225 3916 4962 690 2560
97 3832 3992 2682 3441 4189 5253 748 2572
98 4000 4204 2396 3381 4503 5559 1121 3162
99 4282 4389 2704 3598 4801 6237 1203 3532
00 4285 4270 2780 3669 4764 6362 1095 3582
01 4468 4122 2875 3510 5219 6537 1709 3662
Table A-3a
Net Cost 80-90 for Arts and Sciences (CDN$2001)
Table A-3b
Net Cost 80-90 for Commerce and Engineering (CDN$2001)
01 4468 4122 2875 3510 5219 6537 1709 3662
02 4597 4119 2901 3530 5248 7176 1718 4275
03 5012 4376 2954 3820 5661 8393 1841 5440
04 4957 4292 2898 3820 5792 8219 1972 5321
05 4808 4167 2751 3704 5740 8082 2035 5331mean p50 min p25 p75 max p75‐p25 max‐min
94 2026 1981 856 1199 2860 3148 1661 2292
95 2261 2213 1097 1486 3148 3335 1663 2238
96 2641 2402 1191 1788 3658 3806 1870 2615
97 2547 2435 1057 1901 3376 4023 1475 2965
98 2571 2554 742 1785 3339 4311 1554 3570
99 2544 2725 -283 1665 3639 4555 1974 4838
00 2515 2558 -120 1812 3074 4516 1262 4636
01 2653 2545 570 1868 3096 4463 1228 3893
02 2707 2574 649 1878 3148 4467 1269 3819
03 2766 2674 926 2160 3118 4518 959 3593
04 2698 2593 908 1985 3053 4417 1068 3509
05 2523 2544 908 1649 3014 4353 1364 3446
mean p50 min p25 p75 max p75‐p25 max‐min
94 2197 2257 856 1379 2975 3975 1596 3119
95 2432 2469 1097 1639 3154 4363 1515 3266
96 2847 3002 1191 1970 3739 4962 1769 3771
97 2705 2524 1057 2029 3376 5253 1347 4196
98 2806 2793 742 2233 3347 5559 1114 4817
99 2990 2884 -283 2008 3840 6237 1832 6519
00 3013 2820 -42 2218 3717 6362 1499 6404
01 3337 2957 570 2409 4525 6519 2116 5949
Net Cost 90-100 for Arts and Sciences (CDN$2001)
Table A-3d
Net Cost 90-100 for Commerce and Engineering (CDN$2001)
Table A-3c
01 3337 2957 570 2409 4525 6519 2116 5949
02 3499 3043 649 2480 4743 7176 2264 6527
03 3846 3084 926 2387 4857 8162 2470 7236
04 3741 3005 908 2245 4824 7992 2579 7083
05 3526 2837 908 2113 4401 7859 2287 6952(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year
Year % Applicants % Registrants % Applicants % Registrants % Applicants % Registrants
1994 25% 24% 34% 35% 41% 42%
1995 24% 23% 34% 34% 42% 42%
1996 24% 23% 34% 35% 42% 42%
1997 23% 23% 34% 34% 42% 43%
1998 23% 22% 34% 34% 43% 44%
1999 23% 22% 34% 34% 43% 45%
2000 22% 22% 34% 34% 43% 44%
2001 22% 22% 34% 34% 44% 45%
2002 22% 21% 33% 34% 45% 46%
2003 21% 20% 33% 33% 46% 47%
2004 22% 21% 33% 33% 46% 47%
2005 21% 20% 33% 33% 46% 47%
1994 21% 21% 32% 33% 48% 46%
1995 20% 20% 33% 34% 47% 46%
1996 21% 21% 33% 34% 46% 45%
1997 21% 21% 31% 32% 48% 47%
1998 20% 21% 31% 32% 49% 47%
1999 20% 20% 31% 32% 49% 48%
2000 19% 19% 32% 33% 49% 48%
2001 18% 19% 32% 33% 49% 48%
2002 19% 19% 32% 32% 50% 49%
2003 18% 19% 31% 32% 50% 49%
2004 19% 19% 31% 33% 50% 48%
2005 20% 20% 31% 32% 50% 48%
1994 23% 23% 33% 34% 44% 43%
1995 22% 22% 33% 34% 45% 44%
1996 22% 22% 34% 34% 44% 44%
1997 22% 22% 33% 33% 46% 45%
1998 21% 21% 33% 33% 46% 45%
1999 21% 21% 33% 33% 47% 46%
2000 20% 20% 33% 34% 46% 46%
2001 20% 21% 33% 33% 47% 46%
2002 20% 20% 32% 33% 48% 47%
2003 19% 19% 32% 33% 48% 48%
2004 21% 20% 32% 33% 48% 47%
2005 20% 20% 32% 33% 48% 47%
Table A-4
Distribution of Registrants and Applicants by Neighbourhood Average Income:
Overall and by Grade Category
Low Income* Middle Income* High Income*
Applicants and Registrants with GPA 80+
*High, Middle and Low are defined by the 33rd and 67th percentililes of the distribution of postal codes by the equivalent 
average income of the Census Dissemination Area with which the postal code is associated. 
All Persons Age 15-24 in 2001 Census
40% 25% 35%
All Applicants and Registrants
Applicants and Registrants with GPA 90+